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AVOIDANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT:
LIBERTIES OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Burton C. Bernard*
'The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from
incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence,
the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional
rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain
the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government
may je responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtaµied by peaceful means. Therein lies the security
of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government."t
"Civil liberties, like substantive law itself, frequently inhere in the
interstices of procedure.•.•":j:

frequently criticized reluctance of the Supreme Court to consider complaints of unconstitutional governmental action is manifested in the utilization by the Court of various rules of avoidance of
constitutional issues. Uncompromising defense of this self-restraint
would not be easy to reconcile with the Court's pronounced sensitivity,
in modem times, to the liberties of the First Amendment.1 This article
will examine the considerations underlying the traditional restraint,
and_ will suggest that the Court should modify several of its rules of
avoidance, 2 at least when liberties of the First Amendment are threatened. 3

T

HE

* Member of the Illinois and Missouri Bars. The writer wishes to acknowledge the
the assistance in revising this article of Lewis C. Green, Esq., a member of the Missouri
Bar, who is, however, not responsible for any of the opinions expressed herein.
t Chief Justice Hughes in DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 at 365, 57 S.Ct. 255
(1937).
:t: Freund, "The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties," 4 VAND. L. RBv. 533 at 554
(1951).
1 See e.g., pp. 267-270, infra, especially at note 38.
2 Among discretionary techniques by which the Court may avoid constitutional issues,
not within the scope of this article, are
(a) The granting of judicial review by writ of certiorari is a matter of judicial discretion. For some broad standards of application, see Rule 38(5) of the Rules of the
Supreme Court; Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912 at 917-18, 70 S.Ct. 252
(1950) (separate opinion by Frankfurter, J., filed with a per curiam denial of certiorari);
Harper and Rosenthal, ''What the Supreme Court Did Not Do in the 1949 Term-An
Appraisal of Certiorari," 99 Umv. PA. L. RBv. 293 (1950); STERN AND GRllssMAN, SUPRllMB
CotmT PRACTICE, c. 4 (1950). Cf. the references cited in note 36 infra.
(b) Appeals to the Supreme Court as a matter of right may be dismissed for failure
to present a "substantial federal question." See generally note, 62 HARv. L. RBv. 488
(1949); ROBERTSON AND KmxHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPRllMB CotmT OF nm
UNITED STATES, Wolfson and Kurland ed., §58 (1951).
(c) The Court will not pass upon a "political question." For some standards guiding
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RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL SELF-RESTRAINT

An understanding of the reluctance to face constitutional issues
cannot be developed without appreciating the role of the Court in
drawing the lines beyond which the other organs of government may
not go. 4 Marshall,5 Cooley,0 Thayer,7 Hughes,8 and Frankfurter,9
among others,1° have reminded the Court that the crucial power of
review and its exercise admit of the utmost delicacy. When state action
is challenged, the Court must confront the problem of balancing state
the exercise of discretion compare MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 69 S.Ct. 1 (1948),
with South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 at 277, 70 S.Ct. 641 (1950) (dissenting opinion), 4
VAND. L. REv. 691 (1951).
(d) Constitutional questions will not be decided in non-adversary proceedings. See
United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 at 124, 68 S.Ct. 1349 (1948) (concurring opinion);
Coffman v. Breeze, 323 U.S. 316, 65 S.Ct. 298 (1945); Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. v.
Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 12 S.Ct. 400 (1892); Lord v. Veazie, 8 How. (49 U.S.) 251
(1850). See Statement of the United States as Amicus Curiae, Burco v. Whitworth, 297
U.S. 724, 56 S.Ct. 670 (1936); FREUND, ON UNDBRSTANDING THB SUPRBMB CotmT, c. 3
(1949). The Court could grant a continuance, retaining the case on the docket pending
further proceedings. See Frank, ''The United States Supreme Court: 1947-48,'' 16 Umv.
Cm. L. REv. 1 at 35 (1948).
(e) The Court may conclude that a party has failed to follow the proper procedure
in asserting a constitutional question. For example, he may have failed to raise the issue
for timely consideration in the proceedings below. With regard to state courts, compare
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 69 S.Ct. 894 (1949), with Herndon v.
Georgia, 295 U.S. 441, 55 S.Ct. 794 (1935); as to federal courts, see Ballard v. United
States, 329 U.S. 187, 67 S.Ct. 261 (1946).
(f) As a matter of "comity," the Court may decline to entertain a constitutional
argument until another court of competent jurisdiction has had an opportunity to make a
determination. See the discussion of this problem in relation to habeas corpus petitions of
prisoners confined under state authority in Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 70 S.Ct. 587
(1950).
The first person to attempt an enumeration of rules of avoidance was Cooley in his
CoNSTITOTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 1st ed., 162 (1868). The only modern survey of state
court decisions bearing on the general subject seems to be Burnett, "Avoidance of Judicial
Decision upon Constitutional Ground When Decision Can Be Based upon Other Ground,"
28 ORB. L. RBv. 201 (1948). The first Supreme Court opinion to include a relatively
detailed listing of rules of avoidance was written by Brandeis, J., concurring in Ashwander
v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 at 346, 56 S.Ct. 588 (1936).
s While the scope of this article is limited, procedural developments herein suggested
may eventually affect other "civil liberties"-i.e., liberties protecting the more personal
interests, as distinguished from -property interests-or even those liberties protecting property
interests.
4 See THB FBDBBALIST, No. 78 (Hamilton); JACKSON, THB STRoGGLB FOR JUDICIAL
SoPRBMACY, c. 10 (1941). It has long been settled that the Court should act as an arbiter,
although at one time there was doubt: Jefferson's thought that each branch of government
must have a right in cases within its proper function to determine independently the validity
of an act was put to rest by Marshall. See BBVBRIDGB, LIFE OF JoHN MARsHALL 52-53
(1919). However, the wisdom of judicial review is still questioned by an occasional writer.
See HENDEL, CHARLES EvANs HoGHBS AND THB SoPRBME CotmT, c. 21 (1951) ("..• the
democratic progress of the United States has been and may again, in crisis, be impeded
unless the Court is deprived of this power." p. 296).
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and federal power; if the state action is in the form of judicial procedure, there is involved the additional principle of "comity"-i.e., deference to a substantially independent judicial system.11 Even when
federal action is challenged, the delicacy is acute. Court condemnation
of federal executive or legislative action may, bei;:ause of the inherent
assertion of judicial supremacy, tend to undermine the principle of
separation of powers thought to underlie the structure of the federal
government;12 and the approval of congressional action may tend to
undermine the same principle by sanctioning excessive delegation of
powe~ to the Executive,1 3 or to the Court,14 or, excessive limitation of
the power of the Executive,1 5 or of the Court.16 Furthermore, should
the Court invalidate a statute, either state or federal, a rule of a representative branch of government would be nullified, and if the legislative
act has had the approval of a popularly elected executive officer, the
delicacy would be accentuated. Similarly, to invalidate executive17 or
judicial18 action may handicap ·the implementation of governmental
policies by authorities at least ultimately responsible to the electorate.
The nature of the federal system has not alone been responsible
for the deference of the Supreme Court. Another persuasive factor is
that the Court may be less competent than the legislature to decide the
important questions of public policy which are imbedded in many
5 See Ex parte Randoph, (C.C.D. Va. 1833) 20 Fed. Cas. 254, No. 11558 (the Chief
Justice on circuit).
6 COOLEY, CoNSnTOTIONAL LlMITATlONS 159 (1868).
7 Thayer, "The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,"
7 H.mv. L. R:Ev. 129 (1893) passim.
8 HUGHES, THE StJPRBMB CotmT OF THE UNlTilD STATES (1928) passim.
9 FRANXFtrnTER, LAw AND PoLrrics, MacLeish and Pritchard ed., 24-28 (1939).
10 See, e.g., Miller, J., in Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 333 at 382 (1866);
Holmes, J., in Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142 at 147-148, 48 S.Ct. 105 (1927);
Brandeis, J., in Ashwander v. TVA, 296 U.S. 287 at 345, 56 S.Ct. 588 (1936); Rutledge,
J., in Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 at 571, 67 S.Ct. 1409 (1947).

11 See Covell v. Heyman, Ill U.S. 176 at 182, 4 S.Ct. 355 (1884).
12 THE FEDERALIST, Nos. 47-51 (Madison); but cf. Parker, "Separation

of Powers
Revisited," 49 MICH. L. R:Ev. 1009 (1951).
13 Compare LuCB, LEGISLATIVE PROBLEMS 531 (1935) with KAn, CAsEs ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 264 (1947).
14 Cf. pp. 293-294 and 296 infra.
111 See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 66 S.Ct. 1073 (1946).
16 Cf. p. 264 infra, especially at note 23.
11 See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 1375 (1948); Davis, ''The
Administrative Power of Investigation," 56 YALE L.J. 1111 (1947).
1 8 Strict federal rules on the admissibility of evidence unlawfully obtained are often
said to hamper law enforcement officials in their work. See, e.g., Upshaw v. United States,
335 U.S. 410 at 414, 69 S.Ct. 170 (1948) (dissenting opinion); comment, 42 MICH. L.
REv. 679 (1944). See also LOWENTHAL, THE FEDERAL BtIREAu OF !NvEsTIGATlON, cc. 17,
19 (1950).
.
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constitutional controversies. The Court works within a judicial framework, and the adversary procedure is often ineffective to collect, summarize and interpret the experiences of society.19 A further factor is
that the comparative finality which results from a holding of unconstitutionality is in marked contrast to the :Hexibility found in the legislative process. 2 ° Finally, it would seem that self-restraint rests in part
on considerations of wise statesmanship. The in:Huence wielded by the
Court at any one time depends in large measure upon the temper of
the community. History suggests that if the Court exercises its power
of review too readily and too independently it will be met with rebuke
and disdain, with a consequent diminution of in:Huence on the national
scene.21 Indeed, the President has ignored judicial mandate,22 and
the Congress has restricted the Court's appellate jurisdiction,23 while in
the mid-thirties, the Court's willingness to block social reforms gave
rise to considerable clamor for restriction of its power.24
An awareness of the need for carefully considered constitutional
decisions often bolsters the Court's self-denial. 25 Such a need is apparent when constitutional litigation is viewed with discernment of the
public interest at stake. A decision which is rooted in sound policy is
19 See Southern Pac. Ry. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 at 784, 65 S.Ct. 1515 (1945)
(dissenting opinion). See also Hamilton and Braden, "The Special Competence of the
Supreme Court," 50 YALE L.J. 1319 (1941); JACKSON, THB STRUGGLE I'OR JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY, c. 9 (1941); LAsKI, THB .AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 110-116 (1948).
20 See AFL v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538 at 542, 533-57, 69 S.Ct.
25& (1949) (concurring opinion).
21 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 at 517, 525, 71 S.Ct. 857 (1951)
(concurring opinion.) See also HuGHES, THB SuPRBMB -CoURT 01' THE UNIT.IID STA'l'BS,
50 et seq. (1928).
22 See Ex parte Merryman, (C.C.D. Md. 1861) 17 Fed. Cas. 144, No. 9847 (Taney,
C.J., on circuit); 2 W ARRBN, THB SUPREME COURT IN UNIT.IID STA'l'BS HisTORY, 2d ed.,
368-74 (1926).
23 See Ex parte McCarclle, 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 506 (1869); WARREN, THB SUPREME
CoURT IN UNITBD STA'l'BS HISTORY, 2d ed., 472-91 (1926). See also Tweed, ''Provisions
of the Constitution Concerning the Supreme Court of the United States," 31 BosT, Umv.
L. Rllv. 1 (1951); Roberts, ''Now is the Time: Fortifying the Supreme Court's Independence," 35 A.B.A.J. 1 (1949); Grinnel, ''Proposed Amendments to the Constitution: A
Reply to Fonner Justice Roberts," .3.5 A.B.A.J. 648 (1949). Congress also controls the
purse-strings.
24 During the years 1935 and 1936 the Court in eleven cases declared congressional
acts or parts of acts to be invalid. U.S. LIBRARY 011 CoNGREss: LEGISLATIVE Rlll'BRBNCB
SBRVICB, PROVISIONS 011 THE FBDBBAL LAw HBLD UNcoNsTITOTIONAL BY THE SUPREME
CoURT 011 THE UNITBD STA'l'BS 146-67 (1936). See generally HBNDBL, CHARLBs EvANs
HuGHEs AND THE SUPREME CoURT, c. 19 (1951). Garrison, "The Constitution and The
Future," NBw REPUBLIC, Jan. 29, 1936, p. 328. More than a score of books were written
at the time concerning the powers of the Court. See also Warren, "Legislative and Judicial
Attacks on the Supreme Court of the United States," 47 AM. L. Rllv. 1 at 161 (1913).
25 See, e.g., CIO v. United States, 335 U.S. 106 at· 127, 68 S.Ct 1349 (1946) (concurring opinion); AFL v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450 at 460-61, 65 S.Ct. 1384 (1945);
Chicago &: Grand Trunk Ry. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339 at 346, 12 S.Ct. 400 (1892).
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more conducive to smooth-working adjustments of conflicting interests;
and sound policy is more readily perceived when the question for decision has been adequately presented and clarified in prior proceedings. 26
A reluctance, then, to accede to demands for decision of a question, in
the face of premature or inadequate presentation in the record of the
litigation, is part of an effort to perform with skill the judicial function.
An additional influence is the expectation that each pronouncement
will be read and followed by the lower federal and state courts, and will
often govern the conduct of other branches of government and of private individuals. A lucid opinion, partially made possible by the thorough understanding which derives from a carefully presented case,
serves to minimize confusion in the inferior courts and elsewhere, at
once enhancing a proficient administration of the law and the prestige
of the Court.
SELF-RESTRAINT AND THE FmsT AMENDMENT

While any impatience with the Court's hesitation to decide constitutional issues should be tempered by the realization that nebulous considerations of public policy are frequently the only guides to decision
of such problems,27 the sound principles underlying self-restraint should
not obscure a serious criticism to be leveled at the policy. Perhaps the
nail was hit squarely by Justice Jackson, who, a decade ago, asked:
"Can we not establish a procedure for determination of substantial constitutional questions at the suit of real parties in interest
which will avoid the prematurity of advisory opinions on the one
hand and also avoid technical doctrines for postponing inevitable
decisions? Should we not at least try to lay inevitable constitutional controversies to early rest?"28
In effect, the question was posed whether the Court must be impaled
on either horn of the dilemma presented by considerations of restraint
and alacrity, whether power properly invoked should not be promptly
2 6 Cf. Green, "The Supreme Court, The Bill of Rights, and the States," 97 Umv.
PA. L. REv. 608 at 620-28 (1949) (discussion of ''The Infirmity of the Unanimous or
Eight-terOne Opinion: First Amendment Cases").
27 See Braden, "The Search for Objectivity in Constitutional Law," 57 YALE L.J. 571
(1948). Also deserving of consideration is the fact that the avoidance of constitutional
issues has the effect of lessening the workload of the Court. Statistical data on the business
of the Court may be found in the Harvard Law Review citations in note 31 infra, and in
the issues of the AmrnAL REPORT OF THB DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS.
28 JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 306 (1941).
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exercised. Subsequently, only one Supreme Court opinion has presented what may be called a thorough analysis of the basic policy. In
Rescue Army 11. Municipal Court, 29 Justice Rutledge seems to have
concluded that the prolonged uncertainty produced by the avoidance
of constitutional questions would have to be tolerated. The Justice,
however, failed to analyze the policy in the light of the changing nature
of the Court's business; herein is offered an immediate justification
for re-examining the traditional attitude questioned by Justice Jackson.
Until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Court was
primarily concerned with litigation waged by private parties disputing
questions of private law in which there was little public moment. An
ensuing change saw the emergence of an increasing number of cases, in
which the government was a party, introducing constitutional problems
concerning public authority and property rights. 30 Similar to that development has been the notable increase in recent years of cases presenting conllicts between governmental activity and personal interests31
protected principally by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. The reasons for this alteration in the nature of the cases filling
the Court's dockets are several. First, the gradual incorporation of
portions of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby
limiting actions of the state governments, has prompted much litigation in the Supreme Court. 32 Second, the government's assumption
of new and expanding functions has limited the freedom of the people
in conducting their daily lives, thereby giving rise to many demands
20 331 U.S. 549, 67 S.Ct. 1409 (1947).
so See FRANKFURTER AND LAND1s, THB BuSINEss OF THE SuPREMB CounT 300-303
(1928).
31 Despite the fact that individual writers do not define what constitutes a "civil hoerty" case, much less agree among themselves as to a definition, the number of such cases
by whatever definition is substantial. About one-half of the constitutional decisions 194650 were primarily concerned with "civil rights." Frank, "Court and Constitution: The
Passive Period," 4 VAND. L. REv. 400, 401 (1951). In the 1949 term, 15 cases decided
with full opinion involved "civil liberties." Frank, ''The United States Supreme Court:
1949-50," 18 Umv. Cm. L. REv. l at 37 (1950). In the three terms prior to the 1949
term there were 57 cases dealing with "civil liberties." Dilliard, "Truman Reshapes the
Supreme Court," ATL. MoNTHLY, Dec. 1949, p. 30. See also Table ill, ''The Supreme
Court, 1949 Term," 64 HA.Rv. L. REv. 114 at 161 (1950); Table ill, ''The Supreme Court,
1948 Term," 63 HARv. L. REv. 119 at 123 (1949); Tables XVI, XVII, PRITCHETT, THB
RoosEVELT CounT 131, 141 (1947). For comparison see Frankfurter and Landis, Frankfurter and Hart, Frankfurter and Fisher, and Hart, ''The Business of the Supreme Court,"
HARv. L. Rsv., 43:33, 54; 44:l, 16, 24; 45:271, 286, 294; 46:226, 242, 250; 47:245,
261, 272; 48:238, 250, 258; 49:68, 80, 88; 51:577, 600, 608; 53:579, 592, 602 (for the
terms 1928-1938).
32 See Green, ''The Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme
Court," 46 MicH. L. REv. 869 (1948); also Green, "The Supreme Court, The Bill of
Rights, and the States," 97 Umv. PA. L. REv. 608 (1949).
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on the Court to strike a balance between personal liberty and official
action;33 in turn, these demands have been intensified by war and
postwar tensions. 34 Third, it may be conjectured that the self-restraint
which the Court has manifested in matters of economic concern since
the mid-thirties allows more time to handle cases involving personal
interests.35 Finally, predilections of four or more Justices would seem
to have been re$ponsible for a liberal granting of certiorari in such
cases.ss
This change in the nature of the Court's business has given the
Court great opportunity to develop several areas of constitutional law
which had lain relatively dormant for many years. The case-to-case development of the law has given rise to considerable uncertainty as to the
constitutional limits of official action. Coupled with the increasing
governmental restrictions on individual liberties and an increasing public concern for the protection of those liberties, this uncertainty suggests
that greater importance should be attached to the need for early clarification of constitutional questions. In particular, when those liberties of the First Amendment are endangered, some relaxation of restraint appears to be in order, especially in view of the assertion by six
Justices that the liberties of the First Amendment enjoy a "preferred
position" in the hierarchy of constitutional values.37 In other words,
constitutional limitation on legislative power is comparatively greater
88 See

Green, ''The Supreme Court, The Bill of Rights, and the States," 97 Umv.

PA.. L. REv. 608 at 613-620 (1949).
84 See Fraenkel, 'War, Civil Liberties and the Supreme Court, 1941-1946," 55 YA.LB
L.J. 715 (1946); CoRWIN, ToTAL WAR AND THE CoNsn'l'tl'l'IoN, c. 3 (1947).
85 See Sutherland, "Reasons in Retrospect," 33 CoRN. L.Q. 1-7 (1947); Barnett,
"Constitutional Interpretation and Judicial Self-Restraint," 39 MICH. L. R:sv. 213 (1940);
Rioble, "Some Aspects of Judicial Self-Restraint," 26 VA. L. R:sv. 981 (1940).
3 6 Cf. editorial ST, Loms PosT-ThsPATCH, October 23, 1949, §2, p. 2:2; Frank, ''The
United States Supreme Court: 1949-50," 18 Umv. Cm. L. R:sv. 1 at 40, 52 (1950),
S7See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 at 645, 649, 71 S.Ct. 920 (1951) (dissenting opinion); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 at 579, 581, 71 S.Ct. 857 (1951) (dissenting opinion); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 at 88, 69 S.Ct. 448 (1949); id. at 104, 106
(dissenting opinion); United States v CIO, 335 U.S. 106 at 121, n. 21, 68 S.Ct. 1349 (1948);
id. at 129, 141 (concurring opinion); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S: 558 at 562, 68 S.Ct. 1148
(1948); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 at 28, 62, n. 61, 67 S.Ct. 504 (1946)
(dissenting opinion); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 at 509, 66 S.Ct. 276 (1946);
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 at 530, 67 S.Ct. 1251 (1945); Follett v. McCormick,
321 U.S. 573 at 575, 64 S.Ct. 717 (1944); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 at 164,
64 S.Ct. 784 (1944); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 at 149, 63 S.Ct. 862 (1943)
(concurring opinion); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 at 115, 63 S.Ct. 870
(1943); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 at 600, 608, 62 S.Ct. 1312 (1942) (dissenting
opinion), adopted per curiam on rehearing, 319 U.S. 103, 63 S.Ct. 890 (1943).
The following table is a resume of the above cited opinions, showing which Justices
have used express language of preference. This table does not include opinions from which
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when these liberties are imperiled. 38 The reasons for this preference,
though they have never been clearly articulated by the Justices, may
well support some relaxation of the Court's reluctance to decide constitutional questions.
Most fundamental is the fact that our political process is rooted in
the free interplay of opinion. The First Amendment is designed to
guarantee freedom for the individual to express his beliefs. This freedom is essential to an accurate reflection of the sentiment of the people
in the formation of public opinion and in the operation of the government. Any official restrictions of this freedom will in the first instance
be the work of the legislative and executive branches of government. 39
Such restrictions will, by their very nature, tend to forestall minority
efforts to influence public opinion, thereby depriving those persons
affected of full opportunity to undo the restrictions through the workings of the political process. Furthermore, the availability of the political process as a means of checking official abuse of economic interests,
or other personal interests, is lessened when legislative or executive
action curtails free expression. Accordingly, an especial responsibility
for safeguarding free expression should devolve upon the Court. If this
analysis is the sole basis for preference, then it is clear that for the most
a preferred status might be inferred from the fact that the presumption of validity notmally attaching to legislation was regarded as altered. Two footnote affirmations are deemed
opinion language. The Opelika dissent is listed in the first column of numbers.
Opinions Delivering
Total
Concurring
Dissenting
Opinions
the Judgment of
Opinions
Opinions
Opinions
Written by
the Court
1
2
5
Rutledge
2
3
2
Black
1
2
Douglas
2
2
Reed
2
1
Murphy
1
1
Stone
1
14
38 The "clear and present danger" test requires the Court, in addition to questioning
the reasonable character of legislation curbing free speech, to determine independently
whether the legislation is needed. See generally Antieau, "Clear and Present Danger-Its
Meaning and Significance," 25 NoTRB DAME LAWYER 603 (1950); Barnett, ''Mr. Justice
Murphy, Civil Liberties and the Holmes Tradition," 32 CoRN. L. Q. 177 (1946). That the
"clear and present danger" test may henceforward be far less demanding than in the past
is indicated by the opinion delivering the judgment of the Court in Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857 (1951). For an excellent critical description of the impact of
the Dennis opinion on the test, see Separate Petition of Petitioner John Gates for Rehearing,
39-52.
39THB FEDERALIST, No. 78 at 483-484 (Lodge ed. 1888).
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part only those personal interests protected by the First Amendment are
to be preferred.40
Still a broader basis for preferring First Amendment liberties may be
that the lessons of history have taught us that these liberties are more
precious to society than are others. 41 Philosophic notions may provide
further support for a preference.42 Another relevant but less substantial consideration is that First Amendment liberties, not to mention
other parts of the Bill of Rights, are in specific form as contrasted with
the guarantees protecting property interests, which guarantees must
be carved out of the vague phrases of due process and equal protection. 43 Probably the reasons vary according to the beliefs of the Justice who uses words of preference in a given case; probably most or all
of the factors mentioned are relevant.
Preferring the liberties of free expression over others is open to
serious criticism. A reluctance to entrust the protection of the First
Amendment liberties to the elected organs of government to the same
40 The cases cited in note 37 supra all involve First Amendment liberties. This analysis
was first judicially stated as a possible ground for treating statutes dealing with First Amendment liberties differently from those of economic import by Justice Stone in United States
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 at 152, n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 778 (1938). See KoNEPSKY,
CHIEF JusncE STONE AND THE SuPREME CotmT 269 (1945). An early judicial explanation of the idea that the First Amendment was essential to our political structure is found
in Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 at 372, 375, 47 S.Ct. 641 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring). Subsequent espousal of this line of thought, but without reference to a "preferred position," is found in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 at 95, 60 S.Ct. 736 (1940)
(Murphy, J.); Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 at 301302, 61 S.Ct. 552 (1941) (Black, J., dissenting); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75 at 105, 114, 67 S.Ct. 556 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting); CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S.
382 at 422, 442-443, 70 S.Ct. 674 (1950) (Jackson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 at 581, 71 S.Ct. 857 (1951) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). See also MmKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH 26-27 (1948).
Arguably, freedom of religion is not essential to the effective operation of the political
process. But religious views are often intertwined with the political ideas of individuals.
Indeed, the Court has been unwilling to distinguish among First Amendment liberties; many
of the cases cited in note 37 supra involve freedom of religion.
41 See CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 at 445, 70 S.Ct. 674 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 at 310, 60 S.Ct. 900 (1940) (Roberts, J.). See
generally CoMMAGER, THE AMERICAN MmD (1950); ACTON, EssAYs ON FREEDOM AND
POWER, (1948); CHAPEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941); PARRINGTON, MAIN
CtmRENTs IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (1930); BEARD AND BEARD, THE RxsE oP AMERICAN
CIVILIZATION (1927).
• 42 See Freund, "The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties," 4 VAND. L. REv. 533 at 548550 (1951); RussELL, AUTHORITY AND THE lNDIVIDuAL 104-105 (1949); J. S. MILL, ON
LmERTY, McCallum ed., c. 2 (1946); Riesman, "Civil Liberties in a Period of Transition,"
3 PtlllLIC PouCY 33 at 63-68 (1942) (Harvard Graduate School of Public Administration).
But see Berlin, "Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century," FoREIGN AFFAIRS, April 1950, p.
352.
48 See Jackson, J., writing for the Court in West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 at 639, 63 S.Ct. 1178 (1943).

270

Mrc:mGAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 50

extent that property interests are now entrusted to them is said to betray a lack of faith in the democratic process.44 In the spirit of quid
leges sine moribus the related argument is advanced that the preservation of liberty rests ultimately with the people and their agents; and,
correspondingly, increased concern for free expression on the part of
the Court will tend to erode the sense of responsibility of the people.45
To meet the criticism directly, recourse to the fundamental precept of
the First and Fourteenth Amendments is in order: There shall be limitations on the power of govemment. 46 An alerted Court can prevent
the sapping of the vitality of the First Amendment at the hands of wellintentioned representatives. As one observer has testified, to quarrel
with a vigilant exercise of such judicial review is to quarrel with the
Constitution.47 The same observer has lauded the Court's vigilance as
an invigoration of popular responsibility, suggesting that the Court
has been the greatest single force for popular education in the matter
of individual liberties, and adding that, but for constitutional litigation,
much unduly restrictive legislation would have continued in force indefinitely, unnoticed (except by a negligible minority), unconsidered,
and unchanged. In fine, the reply is at hand that a sharpened response
to alleged deprivations of those liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment stimulates, rather than erodes, popular concem.48
A further cause for dissent from the assertion of a preference for
the First Amendment is the fear that the Court vyould impede the legislatures in achieving a desirable reconciliation of liberty with authority,
giving rise to the danger that liberty might be lost altogether. 49 This
fear assumes that too much freedom would undermine the prestige,
efficiency and stability of democracy; yet the vitality and fiber of American institutions cast serious doubt on the premise. Furthermore, without the increased scrutiny afforded by a body of authority relatively far
44 See Frankfurter, J., dissenting in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 at 646; Curtis, "A Modern Supreme Court in a Modern World," 4 VAND L. RBv.
427 at 432-36 (1951); CoMMAGER, MAJORITY RuLB AND MrnoRITY RIGHTS (1943)

passim.
45 See Frankfurter, J., concurring in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 at 517,
555-556, 71 S.Ct. 857 (1951).
46 Cf. THE FEDERALIST, No. 51 (Madison).
47 Green, Book Review, 32 CA.Ln'. L. RBv. 111 (1944), criticizing in penetrating
fashion the position of Professor Commager.
48 Cf. Freund, ''The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties," 4 V AND. L. RBv. 533 at 552
(1951).
49 Cf. CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 at 394, 70 S.Ct. 674 (1950); Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 at 13, 32-37, 69 S.Ct. 894 (1948) (dissenting opinion); Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 at 574, 61 S.Ct. 762 (1941).
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removed from political pressures, unnecessarily drastic curtailments of
liberty may ensue, deriving from exaggerated apprehensions.50 The
implications would be ominous in the light of the expanding role of
government in the ordering of the people's affairs. With increased
governmental regulation, the ability of the individual freely to express his convictions assumes increased importance. 51
The available bases for preferment and the growing role of government may in the aggregate provide the answer to those who insist in
this matter upon an absolute equality of values in constitutional decisions. 52 And even if one rejects the idea of a "preferred position" with
regard to the merits of claims of unconstitutional action,53 he may logically conclude that the considerations set forth above warrant some
relaxation of the Court's traditional reluctance to consider the merits
of such claims. In fact, criticisms of a "preferred position" seem largely
inapposite to such a relaxation. Thus it is appropriate to examine in
detail two of the more common rules of avoidance in order to determine
the wisdom of accelerating the determination of constitutional controversies.
Two RuLES OF AvomANcE

A. Constitutional Questions Will Not Be Considered at the Instance of One Who Fails To Show that He Has Been Injured by the
Allegedly Unconstitutional Feature of a Statute-Herein: The Defenses of Overbreadth and Vagueness.
Assume that a private party has committed acts which indisputably bring him within the purview of the statute under which he is being prosecuted, and that his conduct is not constitutionally protected.
50 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857 (1951) Separate Petition
of Petitioner John Gates for Rehearing 52-61. See also Internal Security Act of 1950, 64
Stat. L. 987, 50 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1951) §781; ST. Loms PosT-ThsPATCH, Dec. 31, 1950,
§2, p. 2:3-4. See also Holmes, J., dissenting in United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644
at 653, 49 S.Ct. 448 (1929). Cf. DxcEY, lNntonuCTION To THE LAW OF THE CoNsTITUnoN, 8th ed., 273-275 (1915).
51 See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 at 719-720, 51 S.Ct. 625 (1931).
52 Judge Learned Hand seems to stand by an equality of values. See his "Chief
Justice Stone's Conception of the Judicial Function," 46 CoL. L. REv. 696 at 698 (1946);
also, ST. Loms PosT-ThsPATCH, July 15, 1951, §3, p. 1:1-4. Such a view is bolstered by the
formidable demonstration which is available to show that property rights have always been
markedly present in the American spectrum of values. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE
SUPREME CotmT 14-22 (1949).
Although contending that the liberties of the First Amendment should be preferred, the
present writer leaves open the larger and more difficult question of whether other or all
personal interests should also be preferred. Enlarging the number of preferred interests
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The query may be raised whether the statute's language, which has
been applied to the defendant, is so broadly phrased that it is by a
reasonable construction capable of application to other conduct, which
cannot constitutionally be proscribed. If so, the problem is presented
whether the present defendant can raise as a defense the possibility
of unconstitutional applications. Or, in other words, can the defendant attack the statute "on its face" 54 for overbreadth without regard to
the particular facts of his case? (This problem should be distinguished
from the question which arises when a defendant seeks to assert the
invalidity of a different and unrelated section or clause of the same
statute under which judicial proceedings are being brought, thereby
raising what may be called the problem of separability. 55 )
On the basis of precedent, the answer might seem to be wholly in
the negative. The underlying rationale derives from our adversary
system of litigation. The Court is understandably reluctant to decide
a case on the basis of conduct not fully described in the record, conduct which may in fact never take place. Since neither party is principally concerned with the hypothetical facts, the Court may lack not only
a clear statement of these facts but also an adequate argument directed
toward them. Hence, it is said that a defendant cannot complain of
the unconstitutional aspects of hypothetical applications by which he
has not been injured-even though he has been adversely affected by
the statute. As a result, there may be injustice to the defendant being
convicted, for he would not be convicted if the Court invalidated the
statute for excessive breadth. Moreover, there is the prospect of hardship on other individuals who in the future may be prosecuted (although, theoretically, not convicted) for conduct protected by the Constitution, since the excessively broad statute is left in effect without a
restrictive construction. The possible injustice to the defendant is traditionally justified in two ways. First, it is said that the defendant is
would seem to be entirely based on a subjective selection by the Justices; and changes in
the composition of the Court could mean an ever changing list of prefened interests. But cf.
Freund, "The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties," 4 VAND. L. REv. 533' at 535-37 (1951);
see Tussman and tenBroek, "The Equal Protection of the Laws,'' 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341 at
372-373 (1949).
53 See Thornton, "Second-Class Constitutional Rights: Defened Rights versus Preferred Rights,'' 36 A.B.A.J. 620 (1950).
54 The phrase "on its face" is used in this article with reference to the statutory language either as written or as authoritatively construed. See text at note 105 infra. The
phrase has sometimes been used elsewhere with reference to the legislative phraseology, as
distinguished from the judicial construction of the statute.
55 See Stern, "Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court,'' 51 HARV.
L. REv. 76 at 106-128 (1937).
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entitled to no consideration, because even if the statute had been drawn
so narrowly that it could not be applied to conduct protected by the
Constitution, he would still be subject to conviction. Second, the legislature may have indicated its intention that the invalidity of the statute
in one application should not affect the validity of the statute in other
applications. Little, if any, consideration has been given to hypothetical
defendants, perhaps in view of the fact that the possibility of a restrictive construction by the courts, or of an exercise of discretion by the
prosecuting officials, gives substance to the contention that the probability of invalid application is at best conjectural. Influenced by these
considerations, and sensitive to the delicate nature of judicial review,
the Court ordinarily confines itself to the actual application in the pending case.56
Significantly, however, a number of the Court's opinions during the
past two decades have in effect permitted a private party to attack on
its face as being overbroad a statute curbing First Amendment freedoms,
and the action of the Court and the language used by some of the Justices in concurring and dissenting opinions seem to express approval
of a doctrine which would allow such an attack. There follows an analysis of this doctrine which is here termed the defense of overbreadth.

Overbreadth and Vagueness
Thornhill 11. Alabama5 7 was the first case to articulate the proposition that a defendant could assert the defense of overbreadth. Thornhill was convicted under an indictment phrased in terms of an Alabama
statute which prohibited all picketing in labor disputes. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of the United States held that peaceful picketing was
entitled to protection as free speech, and, without considering whether
the particular picketing involved was peaceful, reversed the conviction.
The Court stated:
". . . [where] a penal statute, like that in question here, which
does not aim specifically at evils within the allowable area of state
66 Heald v. District of Columbia, 259 U.S. 114, 42 S.Ct. 434 (1922); Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 162, 27 S.Ct. 188 (1907). Contra: United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214
(1875). In the Reese case and in the seven cases decided between 1875 and 1913 which
are first cited in note 107 infra, the Court, without clear analysis, condemned statutes on
the basis of the invalidity of hypothetical applications. See Stem, "Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court," 51 HARv. L. lmv. 76 at 76-106 (1937).
57 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736 (1940). To the same effect was a companion case, Carl·
son v. California, 310 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 746 (1940). See note, 61 HARv. L. Imv. 1208
(1948).
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control but, on the contrary, sweeps within its ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of speech or of the press ... an accused, after arrest and conviction under such a statute, does not have to sustain the burden of
demonstrating that the State could not constitutionally have written a different and specific statute covering his activities as disclosed by the charge and the evidence introduced agajnst him....
Where regulations of the liberty of free discussion are concerned,
there are special reasons for observing the rule that it is the statute, and not the accusation or the evidence under it, which prescribes the limits of permissible conduct and warns against transgression."58
Those reasons, Justice Murphy explained, were essentially that an
overbroad statute such as the one then before the Court served as a
deterrent on all discussion that might reasonably be regarded as coming
within its scope, even though much of the discussion might be constitutionally protected.5.9
Justice Murphy had some modern precedent upon which to rely
in writing the Thornhill opinion. In 1931 the defense of overbreadth
was recognized and utilized, perhaps inadvertently, in proceedings involving the First Amendment. In Stromberg 11. California, 60 the first
count of an information brought the specifically worded first clause of
the California "red-Hag" statute before the Court. Chief Justice
Hughes, writing for the Court, held the section to be invalid because
the section as written and as authoritatively construed by the state
courts was "so vague and indefinite as to permit the punishment of the
fair use of the opportunity for . . . free political discussion." 61 The
thrust of the opinion in this regard did not rely on the quality of the
defendant's activity. The quoted language was reiterated and utilized
six years later by Justice Roberts in Herndon 11. Lowry. 62 The choice
of language was unfortunate. Chief Justice Hughes in using the words
"vague and indefinite" to express the thought that the definitely worded
310 U.S. 88 at 97-98 (alternative holding).
p. 293 infra, especially at note 133.
60 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532 (1931).
61 Id. at 369. The fact that the statute had been authoritatively construed does not
belie the recognition of the defense of overbreadth; rather such a construction presents a special context in which the doctrine may be applied. Thornhill was an application of the
rationale used by Chief Justice Hughes in a case where the state courts had not construed the
statute in spite of the opportunity to do so. See pp. 284-286 infra.
62 301 U.S. 242, 57 S.Ct. 732 (1937).
158

59 See
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California statute was capable of invalid application63 apparently failed
to make, or to perceive, the distinction between the breadth of a statute
and the vagueness of a statute. A statute may be quite definite
(the antonym of vague), but despite its definiteness it may be overbroad in the sense that it permits of unconstitutional application. Admittedly, a vague statute.is likely also to be broad; nevertheless, it does
not follow that when a statute is broad there is inherent a quality of
vagueness.
In referring to the quality of indefiniteness, Chief Justice Hughes
apparently had in mind the rule of vagueness which had been recognized by the Court since 1875. 64 A criminal statute is said to be void
for vagueness under the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, if the activities which comprise the crime or
crimes created are not clearly delineated. Traditionally, the rationale
underlying the rule of vagueness had been and still is that an indefinite
statute exudes "injustice" and "fundamental unfairness" because of its
failure to provide an "ascertainable standard of guilt" which would enable individuals to curtail their activities, even those which might constitutionally be proscribed, so as to avoid criminal proceedings. 65 However,
the Stromberg language indicated that an additional vice inherent in at
63 Although Chief Justice Hughes used the phrase "punishment of," it would seem he
meant "application of the statute against," for, by hypothesis, constitutionally protected
activity cannot be punished.
64 See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 at 220 (1875). Judicial recognition of the
\'agueness rule is traced in note, 23 hro. L. J. 272 (1948).
65 See CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 at 413, 70 S.Ct. 674 (1950); see Quarles, "Some
Statutory Construction Problems and Approaches in Criminal Law," 3 VAND. L. REv. 531
(1950). Another explanation is that definiteness in the place of vagueness provides a
standard by which judges and juries may perform the function of adjudication with uniformity and fairness. Note, Due Process Requirements of Definiteness in Statutes, 62
HARv. L. REv. 77 (1948). Closely related to the idea of implementing fair adjudication
is the suggestion that vague statutes enhance the growth of arbitrary government. See
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 at 138, 149, 65 S.Ct. 1031 (1945) (dissenting opinion). In addition, statutory definiteness assists the accused to prepare and make his defense.
See Screws v. United States, supra at 113, 128 (concurring opinion).
The use of the words "criminal proceedings" in the text is deliberate. The preponderance of judicial language, with little or no analysis, seems to indicate that individuals are
enabled by the vagueness rule to protect themselves against punishment. If punishment
without notice is the evil of vagueness, then the rule exists to protect individuals against
only valid applications of a vague statute. For, by hypothesis, an invalid application cannot
cause punishment, unless of course a defendant should fail to appeal from an erroneous
decision. It is submitted that individuals should be able to protect themselves against
application of a statute, valid or invalid. Cf. p. 293. United States v. Sharp, (C.C. D.Pa.
1815) 27 Fed. Cas. 1043, No. 16264. For confusion in this matter, see: "And since the
constitutional vice in a vague and indefinite statute is the injustice to the accused in placing
him on trial for an offense the nature of which he is given no fair warning, the fact that
punishment is restricted to acts done with knowledge.•••" CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 at
413, 70 S.Ct. 857 (1950) (emphasis added).
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least some vague statutes was that they might be used against activity
constitutionally protected, and therefore would tend to suppress an
indeterminate amount of legitimate activity. 66 The proposition that a
cloud on conduct is a by-product of vagueness assumes that individuals
will be prone to curtail activity rather than run the risk of criminal prosecution and the attendant loss of time, money, effort, and reputation.
Since all constitutionally· protected activity-for our purpose the free
expression of ideas-is of benefit to society, this expanded basis for the
rule gives proper emphasis to the social impact of many vague statutes.
In short, in order to avoid an unnecessary hampering of. constitutionally protected activity, the Court should permit any defendant to
attack a vague statute on the ground that it might be used against
conduct protected by the Constitution, if in fact the statute is too broad.
Likewise, to afford fairness to the defendant, who has been unable to
predict that his activity would be punished, and to enable others to
avoid criminal proceedings in the future, even though their proposed
activity may not be protected by the Constitution, any defendant should
be allowed to attack any vague statute on the ground that it provides
no reasonably ascertainable standard of guilt.
While one may accept the expanded rationale of the vagueness
rule as suggested in the· Stromberg opinion, one should recognize that
the statutory language in issue, at least as construed, was not vague.67
Rather, the language was definite but so broad that it could be used
against expression constitutionally protected. These facts serve to reveal
the close relationship of the vagueness rule and the rule against overbreadth. If a vague statute hampers legitimate activity, a fortiori will
a definite statute hamper the same activity, for the probability of the
statute's being applied invalidly appears even greater when prosecuting
officials deal with definite language. Unlike a vague statute, however, a
definite statute does give notice of the conduct which is within the scope
of the statute. Despite the partial dissimilarity of the two rules, the
Court in Thornhill reasoned that a statute could be invalid on its
face for overbreadth even though it was not vague.
66 This rationale may have been judicially noted for the first time by Justice Holmes in
International Harvester v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216 at 223, 34 S.Ct. 853 (1914). See
comment, 46 ILL. L. REv. 274 at 278 (1951).
67 But if the statutory language were construed as effective only in those cases where
constitutionally applicable, the statute would take on a vague character. This type of construction technically precludes the defense of overbreadth, but eliminates none of the vices
of the overbroad statute. On the contrary, such a construction adds the objections inherent
in any vague statute. See pp. 282-283 infra.
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The confusion in prospect after the Stromberg and Herndon cases
was realized in Winters v. New York. 68 The case dealt with a statute
which was vague and by virtue of that fact was also open to the charge
of being overbroad. The defendant was indicted and convicted under
sub-section 2 of that part of the New York Penal Law which deals with
obscene prints and articles. The sub-section as written was a broad
proscription of printing, distributing, and selling matter devoted to
accounts of criminal deeds or stories of bloodshed, lust and crime. The
language was construed by the state courts to encompass only matter
which might become a "vehicle . . . for inciting violent and depraved
crimes against the person." In reversing the conviction, the Court,
through Justice Reed, stated that the sub-section as restrictively construed was void on its face because it permitted "within the scope of
its language the punishment of incidents fairly within the guarantee
of free speech," citing Stromberg and Herndon. However, the Court's
subsequent emphasis was on argument and citation of cases dealing
with vagueness, i.e., whether fair notice is provided by a statute. 69
As indicated, the Court did use the language of the Thornhill rationale;
but it did not cite that case, being content to cite two cases on which
Justice Murphy had relied in Thornhill. That the theory of the Court
in Winters was meant to be vagueness is indicated by the dissenters'
interpretation of the Court's opinion as well as by a statement of Justice
Reed in a later case. 70 The failure of the Court to recognize the distinction between a broad statute and a vague statute, to recognize the
expanded rationale of the vagueness rule, and to recognize a fundamental similarity in the rules which would allow a defendant to attack
a statute on its face for vagueness or overbreadth all have encouraged
confusion.

Overbreadth in the Guise of Prior Restraint
Shortly after Stromberg, Chief Justice Hughes wrote the Court's
opinion in Near v. Minnesota. 71 In that case, the Court held invalid,
as violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments, a Minnesota statute
which enabled public officials to enjoin the publication of "malicious,
68 333 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948). The defense of overbreadth was recognized in
United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 1538 (1946); see United Public Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 at 105, 67 S.Ct. 556 (1947) (dissenting opinion); United States v.
CIO, 335 U.S. 106 at 129, 68 S.Ct. 1349 (1948) (concurring opinion).
69Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 at 515-519, 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948).
70 See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 at 79-80, 69 S.Ct. 448 (1949).
71283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625 (1931).

278

MrcmGAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 50

scandalous, and defamatory" newspapers and periodicals. The case
has since been generally interpreted as authority for the proposition that
a "prior restraint" on First Amendment liberties is more objectionable
than a "subsequent restraint." By definition, a prior restraint is one
which is imposed before expression is aired, as distinguished from that
restriction which is imposed in the form of judicial sanction after the expression has been aired. However, it should be added that it is difficult to
determine what the Justices will deem a prior restraint. 72 Although
writers have persuasively argued that a distinction based on the temporal
characteristics of a restraint curtailing free expression is not worthy of
judicial recognition, 73 the Court has never responded. It is here suggested that the prior restraint cases may be -and should be absorbed into
the more meaningful and all-embracing theory here discussed, which
would allow a defendant standing to assert overbreadth. Indeed, a
perusal of the Near opinion indicates that Chief Justice Hughes was
principally concerned with the overbreadth of the Minnesota statute.
Whereas the Winters case had posed the problem of overbreadth in
a vague statute, Saia v. New York74 presented the problem of overbreadth in a specifically worded ordinance imposing a prior restraint.
In question was a city ordinance which required operators of sound
trucks to obtain a permit from the chief of police, issuable in his discretion, before making use of the trucks in specified municipal areas.
Justice Douglas in writing the Court's opinion declared the restriction
void on its face as a curtailment of freedom of speech. The definite
manner in which the ordinance was drawn is evidenced by the fact that
no question of vagueness was discussed in the opinion. The present
writer suggests that the theory of Saia, like Near, is the theory of the
overbroad statute. It is true that the Court did not cite Stromberg,
Herndon, Thornhill, or Winters; nevertheless, the writer would persist. At least six prior restraint cases were available to sustain the conclusion in Saia: Near v. Minnesota, 75 Lovell v. Griffen,76 Hague v.
72 Compare Butler, J., who dissented in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 at 723
(1931), concluding that an injunction against the continued publication of a newspaper was
not a prior restraint, with Black, J., who dissented in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494 at 579, 71 S.Ct. 857 (1951), concluding that the Smith Act in prescribing criminal
penalties for past actions imposed a prior restraint.
73 See Freund, "The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties," 4 VAND. L. REv. 533 at 537539 (1951); Antieau, "Judicial Delimitation of the First Amendment Freedoms," 34 MARQ.
L. REv. 57 at 59-61 (1950); 2 CooLEY, CoNsTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 8th ed., 885
(1927); CHAF;EE, FREEDOM OP SPEECH 8-12 (1920).
74 334 U.S. 558, 68 S.Ct. 1148 (1948).
75 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625 (1931).
76 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666 (1938).
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CIO,77 Cantwell v. Connecticut,78 Jones v. Opelika,79 and Largent v.
Texas, 80 three of which were cited by the Court. Cases typified by Saia
do not invalidate prior restraint per se; rather the objection is to the wide
discretion conferred by the ordinance on the city official who administers
the ordinance. The wide discretion exists because the ordinance is drawn
too broadly. For example, in Saia, the Court stated that the ordinance was
not "narrowly drawn to regulate the hours or places of use of loudspeakers, or the volume of sound (the decibels) to which they must be
adjusted." 81 It is clear that the Court would uphold a prior restraint
imposed by an ordinance of sufficiently narrow scope. 82 This reasoning
' is the essence of the Thornhill rationale.
More insight may be gleaned from the case of Kovacs v. Cooper, 88
which brought before the Court an ordinance imposing penalties for
violation of an outright prohibition against using sound amplifiers in
certain municipal areas. Justice Reed delivered the judgment of the
Court, upholding the ordinance at issue, in an opinion in which Chief
Justice Vinsonand Justice Burton joined. The opinion assumed that
the state courts had interpreted the ordinance to prohibit only sound
trucks which produced "loud and raucous" noises; hence the ordinance
might fairly be considered neither too vague nor too broad. But in reaching the conclusion of validity, the Court did not expressly recognize the
overbroad doctrine. First, Saia was distinguished, unfortunately by ambiguous language. Characterizing the Saia enactment as (a) a previous
restraint and (b) one with no standards prescribed for its exercise,
Justice Reed stated, "This ordinance [Kovacs] is not of that character. It
contains nothing comparable to the ... ordinance in the Saia case."84
The ensuing reasoning was to the effect that a ban on "loud and
raucous" noises emitted by sound trucks was a permissible exercise of
the city's power to combat nuisances. Even if it is assumed that the
Justice considered the distinction of breadth and not the distinction of
prior restraint as the significant one, the opinion left open the question
whether he and the other two Justices would have upheld an overbroad statute.
77 307

U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954 (1939).
78 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900 (1940).
79 316 U.S. 584 at 603, 62 S.Ct. 1231 (1942) (dissenting opinion) adopted per curiam
on rehearing, 319 U.S. 103, 63 S.Ct. 890 (1943).
80 318 U.S. 418, 63 S.Ct. 667 (1943).
81334 U.S. 558 at 560, 68 S.Ct. 1148 (1948).
82Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 61 S.Ct. 762 (1941).
88 336 U.S. 77, 69 S.Ct. 448 (1949).
84 Id. at 82-83 (emphasis added).
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Justices Frankfurter and Jackson were of the opinion that the
ordinance as interpreted by the state courts was a blanket prohibition.
Consistent with their stand in Saia, they concluded that it was valid
notwithstanding. Although it is possible that these Justices recognized
the existence of the doctrine of the overbroad statute, upholding the statute in Kovacs because it was either sufficiently narrow as written or because they reject the doctrine, there is no support for these conclusions
in their opinions. 85 Nor do their opinions mention the arguments made
by the dissenters.
Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge agreed that the
prohibition was a blanket one in the absence of a restrictive construction by the state courts, recognized the doctrine of overbreadth as underlying Saia, and accepted that doctrine, concluding that the ordinance
was invalid on its face. 86
In two cases decided midway in the 1950 term, the Court, with the
exception of one Justice, again demonstrated that the defense of overbreadth is available to a defendant prosecuted under what the Court
deems a prior restraint. In Kunzv. New York, 87 the.defendant's conviction was reversed because it was based on a New York City ordinance
which did not contain "appropriate standards" limiting the discretion
of the administrative official whose duty was to grant or refuse permits
authorizing the use of the streets for religious worship meetings. Presenting a spirited defense of the technique of adjudging a prior restraint
on its face, Justice Frankfurter in a concurring opinion stated that the
vice to be guarded against is arbitrary action on the part of the administrative officials.88 Yet officials responsible for invalid applications may
be acting quite reasonably, perhaps due to the very fact that the statute
is excessively broad. The essential vice would seem to be the danger of
invalid application, not arbitrary application. Alone in dissent, Justice
Jackson refused to consider even a prior restraint on its face, stating that
the instant application of the restraint is the only issue to be considered
0

85 Id. at 89, 97 (concurring opinions).
86 Id. at 98, 104 (dissenting opinions).
87 340 U.S. 290, 71 S.Ct. 312 (1951)

(Vinson, C.J., delivering the opinion of the
Court, concurred in by Justices Black and Frankfurter). In Niemotko v. Maryland, 340
U.S. 268, 71 S.Ct. 325 (1951) (Vinson, C.J. delivering the opinion of the Court, concurred in by Justices Black and Frankfurter), the Court assumed that a prior restraint
was involved, and held such a restraint invalid on its face because of the lack of proper
standards. But because the opinion seems to be based also on a denial of equal protection
of the laws, the position of the Justices who joined in the opinion is not altogether clear.
Justice Frankfurter based his concurring opinion solely on the ground of denial of equal pr<r
tection of the laws. 340 U.S. 268 at 273.
88 340 U.S. at 273, 284.
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and concluding that Kunz was constitutionally convicted. 89 His unqualified refusal to allow a defendant to assert overbreadth seems
grounded in the apprehension that government authorities could not
effectively regulate evils as they arise if statutes intended to curb those
evils are struck down for overbreadth. He points out the absence of
specific criteria formulated by the Court which would aid legislative
draftsmen to enact statutes sufficiently narrow to sustain convictions.
It is true that the Court has never formulated criteria which would
assure the validity of statutes dealing with certain evils,90 but it
would not seem improper if the Court were to indicate with some
amount of specificity the reasons why a condemned statute was considered too broad. Furthermore, permitting the defense of overbreadth
serves to give notice that draftsmen must make a conscientious effort to
write reasonably narrow statutes. It is submitted that the minimization
of the hampering of constitutionally protected activity which would
result from judicial condemnation of overbroad statutes outweighs both
the burden of exacting draftsmanship imposed on legislators and the
effects on society of reversals of some convictions valid but for statutory
overbreadth.
In the companion case of Feiner v. New York 91 the Court upheld
a conviction under a disorderly conduct statute, which imposed
penalties for using threatening and abusive language or acting in a
disturbing manner, or congregating with others on a public street, refusing to move on when ordered by the police. The prevailing opinion of the
Court rested the decision on a valid application of the statute and made no
mention of the problem of the statute's breadth. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, indicated that he will not allow the defense of overbreadth with
regard to the face of what he deems a subsequent restraint. 92 A position
which concedes the wisdom of allowing an attack on the face of a prior
restraint appears difficult to reconcile with a position which denies the
wisdom of such an attack on the face of a subsequent restraint. Indeed,
Justice Douglas, in a dissenting opinion, observed that police censorship
has all the vices of the censorship which has been rejected in prior restraint cases. 93 Yet he did not mention the defense of overbreadth, disso Id. at 295.
90 In Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 71 S.Ct. 325 (1951), the Court stated
that "appropriate standards" must be "narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite."
91 340 U.S. 315, 71 S.Ct. 303 (1951) (Vinson, C.J., delivering the prevailing opiniorl
of the Court).
92 340 U.S. at 273, 287.
93 Id. at 329.
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senting on the ground that the application of the statute in the instant
case was invalid.94
Is it not time for the Court to announce that the prior restraint
cases are authority for the proposition that a defendant may assert
overbreadth in First Amendment litigation?
Overbreadth and Federal Legislation
The defense of overbreadth has only recently affected the course
of constitutional decision with regard to federal legislation. While recognizing the issue of -overbreadth, the Court has avoided it by facile restrictive construction. Should the issue of overbreadth be pressed in a
future case where a restrictive construction of a definitely worded statute would be inappropriate, the following analysis of two recent cases
involving federal legislation seems to indicate that the defense of overbreadth would be allowed and the issue decided.
In CIO v. Douds95 the language in section 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act was attacked as being too vague and also too broad.96 Upholding
the validity of the provision, Chief Justice Vinson, delivering the judgment of the Court, stated that "the breadth of the provision concerning
belief in overthrow of the Government by force would raise additional
questions ..." if a restrictive construction were not adopted. 97 Although seemingly conceding that a challenge to the face of an unequivocally specific statute for overbreadth would be proper, the Chief
Justice, in disposing of the charge of vagueness, employed only terms of
injustice to individuals, not terms of suppression of legitimate activity.
He held that as restrictively construed the provision was not too vague.
In contrast, Justice Frankfurter, in a separate opinion, refusing to make
a restrictive construction, and declaring the provision as written void
for vagueness, recognized the expanded rationale of the vagueness rule.
He stated that statutory vagueness is condemned because it "raises
hazards unfair to those who seek obedience or involves surrender of
freedoms which exceeds what may fairly be exacted." 98 However, Justice Frankfurter was silent on the question of overbreadth.
On June 4, 1951, the concept of statutory overbreadth received
peculiar and puzzling treatment in the historic case of Dennis v.
94 To

the same effect was the dissenting opinion of Justice Black, id. at 321.
95 339 U.S. 382, 70 S.Ct. 674 (1950).
96 See pp. 289-290 infra.
91.339 U.S. 382 at 406.
98 Id. at 415, 419 (concurring in part, dissenting in part). In the instant case, accord•
ing to the opinion, the vaguely worded oath was unfair in that it raised the hazard of prosecution for perjury for those who would seek obedience. Id. at 420. The added ground for
invalidity was that the oath because of its vagueness touched upon matters which could "not
be subjected to compulsory avowal of belief or disbelief." Id. at 421-422.
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United States. 99 Chief Justice Vinson, who wrote the prevailing opinion which was joined in by Justices Burton, Minton and Reed, seems
to have recognized the defense of overbreadth but ignored its rationale.
In response to the defendants' argument that sections 2 and 3 of the
Smith Act were overbroad because they purported to prohibit speech
which did not create the requisite danger of violence, the Court thought
it necessary to construe those sections restrictively; accordingly, they
were construed to· outlaw the activity described by them only where
there is a "clear and present danger" of violence. Yet this vague
restrictive construction, while it theoretically eliminates the possibility of invalid application of and unconstitutional conviction under
the Smith Act, would seem to impose on constitutionally protected
activity as great a cloud as did the written language of the Smith
Act. While the statute is no longer overbroad, it has all the vice of an
overbroad statute. The restrictive construction accomplished little,
except to add an element of vagueness. The Court handled the problem of vagueness solely in terms of fair notice to individuals with no
mention of the deterrent effect on constitutional activity which seems to
be as characteristic of the Smith Act as construed as it was of the Smith
Act as written. On this analysis, the Court in the first instance should
either have denied the defendants' standing to assert overbreadth or have
decided whether the statute as written was excessively broad. Had the
Court denied standing or had it decided this issue one way or the other,
there would have beenno need for the restrictive construction which presented the problem of vagueness, while retaining the vice of overbreadth.
Overbreadth and the Present Justices
What then is the current status of the law? All of the present
Justices, except Justice Jackson, will permit the defense of overbreadth when prior restraints are before the Court. When a statute
not imposing a prior restraint is before the Court, Justices Black and
Douglas have indicated in the dissents of Kovacs v. Cooper that they will
then also permit the defense of overbreadth. Not so with Justice Jackson, who has indicated in his Kunz dissent that he regards prior restraints and subsequent restraints in the same light. Justice Frankfurter
has indicated in his Feiner concurring opinion that he will not permit
the defense of overbreadth with regard to a subsequent restraint, even

99 341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857 (1951). See the discussion of this case with regard to
another canon of avoidance at pp. 290-292 infra.
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though in Douds he recognized the expanded basis of the vagueness
rule and indicated that he would permit a statute to be attacked on its
face for vagueness. Justices Burton, Minton, Reed and Vinson, on the
basis of the Douds and Dennis performances,1° 0 appear to take the incongruous position that the defense of overbreadth is also allowable with
regard to subsequent restraints, at the same time refusing to recognize
the expanded rationale of the vagueness rule, even when the vague statute throws a cloud on constitutionally protected activity. It would not
be a long step for Justice Frankfurter to join with the six Justices who
appear to recognize the defense of overbreadth without regard to the insubstantial distinction between prior restraint and subsequent restraint.
Nor should it be too difficult for these six Justices in turn to join with
Justice Frankfurter who has recognized the expanded rationale of the
vagueness rule. It is hoped that Justice Clark will declare himself in
favor of the defense of overbreadth and the expanded rationale of the
vagueness rule, and that Justice Jackson will reconsider his position. At
this writing, the defense of overbreadth appears to have achieved over
the course of the past twenty years full status as a judicial technique in the
struggle to preserve First Amendment liberties against invasion by
state legislatures; the defense, although recognized by a majority of the
Justices when federal legislation is before the Court, has nevertheless
been frustrated by the technique of vague restrictive construction utilized in the Dennis case.
When Should a Defendant Have Standing to Challenge
the Face of a Statute
The argument in favor of permitting a private party to attack a
statute on its face for overbreadth, or indefiniteness, is most persuasive
in those cases where, if the attack is not allowed, future unconstitutional
applications would be possible. For example, when the Supreme Court
is called upon to review a prosecution under a state statute, authoritatively construed by the state courts in an overly broad or indefinite manner, the defense should be permitted.101 The danger of prospective invalid applications is likewise present when the state court has not re-.
stricted the state statute by construction at all despite an opportunity
to do so,1°2 or when a federal statute has not been narrowed by construe100 Justice Clark did
101 Accord, Winters

not participate in the decision of either case.
v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948); Stromberg
v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532 (1931).
102 See, e.g., Thomhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736 (1940); lliinois v. Beauhamais, 408 ID. 508, 97 N.E. (2d) 343 (1951), cert. granted, 20 U.S.L. WEEK 3088
(1951); also the second paragraph of note 107 infra.
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tion, or has been narrowed by an inferior tribunal so unreasonably that
the construction cannot be tolerated. Where an authoritative construction renders a statute not capable of sustaining unconstitutional application and conviction, but nevertheless renders it unduly vague, the
defense of vagueness should be allowed.103 While the danger of invalid
applications is equally prevalent when the state courts have not yet
had an opportunity to construe a state statute challenged for overbreadth or indefiniteness,1° 4 the policy of allowing the states a wide
latitude in working out their own problems with a minimum of federal
interference would justify a denial of standing to challenge the statute
on its face in this context.
Where a sufficiently narrow and definite construction has been properly imposed, there can be no complaint of prospective overbreadth. In
this situation the Court has indicated that the attack will not be permitted, or, in other words, the face of a statute includes judicial construction as well as legislative draftsmanship.105 Thus the Court here
implicitly rejects the use of the defenses of overbreadth and vagueness
as a spur to encourage more precise draftsmanship in Congress and in
the state legislatures. At the same time the Court tolerates the unnecessary uncertainty prevalent from the effective date of the statute to the
time of a binding construction by the highest appropriate state or federal
10a Contra: Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857 (1951) (alternative
holding) semble. There are available two techniques which enable the Court to avoid the
issue of vagueness, whether created by the Court or by the legislature. One is based on the
reasoning that if the defendant has had or should have had notice from his activities that
he was violating the statute, he should not have standing to assert vagueness. Accord,
Dennis v. United States, (2d Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 201 (alternative holding) semble,
affd. on other grounds semble 341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857 (1951); cf. CIO v. Douds, 339
U.S. 382, 70 S.Ct. 674 (1950) semble; see Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 at 113,
129, 65 S.Ct. 1031 (1945) (concurring opinion). The other technique is based on the
idea that a defendant who has acted with what the statute in question prescribes as an
improper "intent" or motive should not have standing to assert vagueness. Accord, Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (alternative holding) semble; Williams v. United
States, 341 U.S. 97, 71 S.Ct. 576 (1951); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945);
Contra: Williams, supra at 104 (Justices Frankfurter, Jackson and Minton dissenting without
opinion); Screws, at 138 (Justices Roberts, Frankfurter and Jackson dissenting). Since under
this theory the statute requires the improper "intent'' or motive, no defendant could be con•
victed who had a proper motive. Hence, future defendants, depending on the quality of
their motive, either could not or would not have to rely on the defense of vagueness. Since
both techniques contemplate that the vague statute in question shall remain indefinite for the
future, it seems clear that a use of them by the Court will reHect a desire to avoid the
implications in constitutional decision of a meaningful rule of vagueness. Cf. Frankfurter,
J., in CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 at 415, 420, 70 S.Ct. 674 (1950) (concurring in part,
dissenting in part); comment, 46 ILL. L. R:sv. 274 at 278 (1951); see p. 276 supra.
1 04 This would be the case if the lower court proceeding were an injunction suit
brought in a federal court to restrain the enforcement of a state law. E.g., AFL v. Watson,
327 U.S. 582, 66 S.Ct. 761 (1946); cf. 36 Stat. L. 1162 (1911), 28 U.S.C. §379 (1940),
as amended, 62 Stat. L. 968 (1948), 28 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1951) §2283.
105 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 61 S.Ct. 762 (1941).
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court. Absent future uncertainty, these considerations are regarded as
outweighed by the objections, previously noted, to the defense of overbreadth. A compromise perhaps more fair might be achieved by upholding the restrictive construction as to the future, but reversing the
instant conviction, thereby giving the statute validity only in a prospective sense.106 And at least with regard to federal legislation, it is of
course arguable that the entire statµte should be struck down. However, the suggested compromise is probably the most liberal available
when state legislation is being litigated because of the wise deference
to the autonomy of the states, and in recognition of the propriety of
leaving to the state courts the responsibility of prodding the state legislatures in the matter of draftsmanship.
Any discussion of a defendant's standing to question statutory
overbreadth should point out the difficulties which may attend a recognition of such standing. Which potential applications of a statute are
material in determining the validity of a statute on its face? For example, the likelihood of some applications may be deemed too remote to
merit attention. Or, the conduct subject to invalid application may be
regarded as too inconsequential to serve as a basis of sustaining a
defendant's attack on the face of a statute. Should any weight be given
to the fact that overbroad language in an act has long been taken,
whether judicially construed or not, to convey a meaning more restrictive than literalness would indicate? What importance should attach
to the inability of the legislature, because of the nature of the activity
being proscribed, to frame a narrow statute to combat given evils? It
is suggested that the resolution of these matters is for the sound judgment of the Court in the specific case. But analysis would be unrealistic
if it discounted the probability that these elements will to some degree
enter into the deliberations of the Court on welcoming the concept of
statutory overbreadth as such-a concept having special force when related to the liberties of the First Amendment-into the substance of
constitutional law.

B. The Court Will if Reasonably Possible Construe a Statute To
Avoid a Serious Question of Constitutionality.
"We have repeatedly held that as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by
the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which will save the act.
106 See

note, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1208 at 1212 (1947).
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Even to avoid serious doubt the rule is the same."107 The justification
for this rule of restrictive construction is found in a presumption that
in the absence of clear meaning of a statute's language and reasonably
unambiguous legislative history the Congress has not intended to
change or clarify existing law in excess of its constitutional powers.
This presumption rests on the doubtful hypothesis that no legislative
body would intend to pass a statute which would be invalid.108 Further
support is found in the fact that a large segment of congressmen. are
lawyers by training,109 more likely therefore to have been aware of constitutional limitations. The presumption may appear to be especially appropriate when the Court is dealing with a statute curtailing First Amend101 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 at 30, 57 S.Ct. 615 (1937).
The Court's willingness to construe in order to save was not always evident prior to 1937.
Chief Justice Waite in striking down a federal criminal enactment had, in 1875, announced
that the Court was without power to add saving words of limitation to an overly broad
statute because to do so would amount to usurpation of the legislative function. United
States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875). The view of the Reese case greatly inHuenced constitutional decision in subsequent years. E.g., Trade Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879);
United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 1 S.Ct. 601 (1882); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3, 3 S.Ct. 18 (1883); Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 7 S.Ct. 656 (1887); James v.
Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 23 S.Ct. 678 (1903); Illinois Central R.R. v. McKendree, 203
U.S. 514, 27 S.Ct. 153 (1906); Butts v. Merchants Co., 230 U.S. 127, 33 S.Ct. 964
(1913). However, during the same period of time, there was indication that the extreme
view of the Reese case was gradually gaining disfavor and that the Court was beginning to
believe it should as a matter of discretion restrictively construe whenever reasonably possible. E.g., Presser v. lliinois, 116 U.S. 252, 6 S.Ct. 580 (1886); Hooper v. California,
155 U.S. 648, 15 S.Ct. 207 (1895); Knights Templars' Inctemnity Co. v. Jarman, 187
U.S. 197, 23 S.Ct. 108 (1902); United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366,
29 S.Ct. 527 (1909); The Abbey Dodge, 223 U.S. 166, 32 S.Ct. 310 (1912). In the
period 1913-1937, the positivism of the Reese case gave way to self-restraint as expressed
in the Jones-Laughlin case. Compare Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U.S. 642, 41
S.Ct. 606 (1921); Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 46 S.Ct. 619 (1926); Crowell
v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 at 65, 52 S.Ct. 285 (1932) (dissenting opinion), with United
States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 36 S.Ct. 658 (1916); Baender v. Barnett, 255 U.S.
224, 41 S.Ct. 271 (1921); Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 45 S.Ct. 446 (1925);
Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Boone, 270 U.S. 466, 46 S.Ct. 341 (1926); United States v.
La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 51 S.Ct. 278 (1931); Crowell v. Benson supra; Anniston Mfg.
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337, 57 S.Ct. 816 (1937). One of the purposes of this article is
to suggest that the pendulum continued to swing after 1937, and has now, at least in First
Amendment cases, apparently reached the extreme opposite of the Reese view: "It is the
duty of the federal courts to interpret federal legislation in a manner not inconsistent with
the demands of the Constitution." See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 at 501, 71
S.Ct. 857 (1951).
Although the Court will accept a state court construction of a state statute, it is
uncertain what the Court will do when faced with a state statute which has not been
restrictively construed in prior state q:iurt proceedings. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
91, 60 S.Ct. 736 (1940) (statute construed as written and issue decided); Musser v. Utah,
333 U.S. 95, 68 S.Ct. 397 (1948) (cause remanded); Gamer v. Los Angeles, 341 U.S.
716, 71 S.Ct. 909 (1951) (restrictive construction by state courts assumed and issue decided).
108 See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 at 269, 6 S.Ct. 580 (1886); Grenada County
Supervisors v. Brogden, 112 U.S. 261 at 268-69, 5 S.Ct. 125 (1884); United States v.
Coombs, 12 Pet. (37 U.S.) 73 at 75 (1838).
109 For example, more than one-half of the 81st Congress' membership was legally
trained. U.S. Nsws, Nov. 26, 1948, p. 11:3.
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ment freedoms, for the legislators in drafting the law may be supposed to
have held basic liberties in high esteem.110
Yet there are factors which go far to discredit the presumption. For
one thing, the legislature's consideration of a statute's validity may in
fact have been insubstantial because the problem was contemplated
by few, if any, of those who seriously analyzed the measure. Whatever consideration the statute's validity did receive may have been superficial if the legislators saw no substantial problem, or thought that the
function of ascertaining constitutionality is exclusively one for the judiciary. Even if the matter was thoroughly considered by many, the
conclusion may erroneously have been that there was no serious
doubt of validity-or, in the alternative, that despite a serious doubt
the statute as written were better enacted and the :6.nal responsibility
passed to the Court.111 In addition, a high regard for basic liberties
may have been seriously watered down by the pressures of politics or
the strain of crisis.11 2 Moreover, where the text and context of a statute
clearly militate against a narrow interpretation, a restrictive construction conspicuously departs from the logical basis of this rule of avoidance.
By the start of the 1951 term, the Court had made such departures
when confronted with the three constitutional issues prominent in modem free speech cases. In United States v. CIO,113 the Union and its
President were indicted for making expenditures from the funds of the
Union for the publication of an editorial in the CIO News, a periodical
regularly published by the Union, urging members of the organization
to vote for a particular candidate in a special congressional election held
in Maryland. The contention of the Government was that such activity
was a violation of section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act:1 14 amending section 313 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act. The relevant language
of the section is as follows:
"It is unlawful for ... any corporation ... or any labor organization to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with
110 Justice Douglas' opinions have often expressed this view. See, e.g., Tan v. Phelan,
333 U.S. 6 at 10, 68 S.Ct. 374 (1948); Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146 at 156, 66
S.Ct. 456 (1946). See also Knauff v. Shauglmessy, 338 U.S. 521 at 547, 550, 70 S.Ct.
329 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
111 See e.g., Sutherland, "Freedom and Internal Security," 64 HARv. L. R:Bv. 383 at
397, n. 81, 405, n. 108 (1951) (Internal Security Act of 1950). See also McCarran, "The
Internal Security Act of 1950," 12 Umv. Prrr. L. R:Bv. 481 at 489-495 (1951).
112 See Roberts, J., concurring on other grounds, in Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 at
308, 65 S.Ct. 208 (1944); ST. Loms PoST-DISPATCH, September 13, 1950, §3, p. 2:2.
11a 335 U.S. 106, 68 S.Ct. 1349 (1948).
114 61 Stat. L. 159 (1947), 18 U.S.C. (1948) §610.
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any election at which Presidential and Vice Presidential electors or
a Senator or Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to Congress are to be voted for...."
Both the Government and the CIO conceded. that the activities were
covered by the act. 1115 A Congressional Joint Committee to survey the
operation of the Labor Law agreed that the CIO action was in direct
violation of the act.116 Most important, legislative history indicated the
same thing.117 The district court held the provision invalid, on the
ground that the CIO activities were protected by the First Amendment.
On appeal, the Supreme Court by a majority of five held that the CIO
expenditures were not within the prohibition of the statute. Justice
Reed, writing for the Court, recited the obligation resting on the Court
to take care, in construing congressional enactments, to interpret them
so as to avoid a serious question of constitutionality. Justice Frankfurter in concurrence adopted the narrowing construction even though
he was of the opinion that the point had not been raised by counsel.
Justice Rutledge, concurring on other grounds, stated that the restrictive construction by the Court in the light of the language of the statute
and the legislative history amounted to abdication of the judicial
function.
In CIO v. Douds,118 the Court restrictively construed section 9(h)
of the Taft-Hartley Act in order to avoid the constitutional issue of
overbreadth. Section 9(h) reads:
"No investigation shall be made by the [National Labor Relations] Board ... and no complaint shall be issued ... unless there
is on file with the Board an affidavit . . . by each officer of such
labor organization ... of which it is an affiliate or constituent unit
that he is not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with
such party, and that he does not believe in, and is not a member of
or supports any organization that believes in or teaches, the overthrow of the United States Government by force or any illegal or
unconstitutional methods. The provisions of section 35A of the
Criminal Code shall be applicable in respect to such affidavits."
( emphasis added.)
It was argued inter alia that the ''belief" provision was so broadly
worded that it might be applied to persons protected in their beliefs by
the Constitution; for example, one who believes in the overthrow by
111116 U.S. I.Aw WEEK 3327, 3328-29 (1948).
110 S. Rep. No. 986, pt. 1, 80th Cong., 2d sess. 39 (1948).
117 93 CoNG. REc. 6436-40 (1947) (Sen. Taft); H.R. Rep. No. 2739, 79th Cong.,
2d sess. 40, 46 (1946); S. Rep. No. 1, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 1st sess. 38-39 (1947).
11s 339 U.S. 382, 70 S.Ct. 674 (1950).
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violence of any government which has become unduly oppressive, even
if that government has evolved in the course of time from the present
United States Government. Chief Justice Vinson, writing for the
Court, adverted to the rule of restrictive construction, and concluded
that the "legislative purpose" required that the belief provision be read
to apply only to "those persons [and organizations] whose beliefs
strongly indicate a will to engage in political strikes and . . . direct
action ... who believe in violent overthrow of the Government as it
presently exists under the Constitution as an objective, not merely a
prophecy."119 In making this saving interpretation, the Chief Justice
made no reference to the plain meaning of the words nor did he refer
to legislative history, which indicates Congress intended the meaning
which would ordinarily be attributable to the words used.120 In dissent
from this part of the Court's opinion, Justice Frankfurter, devoted advo:cate of self-restraint, observed that "what Congress has written does not
permit such a gloss nor deletion of what it has written," and declared
the belief provision void.121
·
22
In Dennis v. United States,1 the Court upheld the conviction of
the top eleven Communist leaders who had been indicted under section 3 of the Smith Act:1 23 for conspiring to violate sections 2(a)(l)
and 2(a)(3) of the act. Sections 2 and 3 read:
"Sec. 2 (a) It shall be unlawful for any person(1) to knowingly or wilfully advocate, abet, advise, or teach
the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or
destroying any government in the United States by force or violence, or by the assassination of any officer of such government;
(2) with the intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of
any government in the United States to print, publish, edit, issue,
circulate, sell, distribute, or publicly display any written or printed
matter advocating, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, de110 Id. at 407.
120 NLRB, LBcrsLATIVE HisTORY oP Tm1 LAllon MANAGBMllNT RELATIONS Ac:r,
1947. Sec. 9(h) as it was reported to the House and as it was originally passed by the
House and Senate included, in addition to the present language concerning belief, language
which substantially embodied the gist of the Court's subsequent interpretation. The section
then declared also against a union officer who ''by reason of active and consistent promotion
or support of the policies and doctrines of the Co=unist Party can reasonably be regarded
as being a member of or affiliated with such party." Id. at 18, 63. The quoted language
was deleted by the Conference Co=ittee, and that committee's draft became law. H.R.
Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 2d sess. 12 (1948).
121339 U.S. 382 at 415, 422, 70 S.Ct. 674 (1950). The basis 'for his dissent was
that the belief provision was vague. For the close tie between the defenses of vagueness and
overbreadth, see pp. 273-277 infra.
122341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857 (1951).
12s 54 Stat. L. 671 (1940), 18 U.S.C. (1946) §§9-11.
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sirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or violence;
(3) to organize or help to organize any society, group or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any government in the United States by
force or violence; or to be or become a member of, or affiliate with,
any such society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof.

Cb) ...

Sec. 3. It shall be unlawful for any person to attempt to commit, or to conspire to commit, any of the acts prohibited by the
provisions of this title." (emphasis added.)
The defendants argued that these sections were unconstitutional,
since they proscribe speech even in the absence of the traditional "clear
and present danger" of the substantive evil which Congress was attempting ultimately to prevent. As Chief Judge Hand pointed out, "literally,
they make criminal the fulminations of a half crazy zealot on a soapbox,
calling for an immediate march upon Washington."124 A fortiori it is
apparent that the sections also purport to prohibit other argument and
exhortation also protected by the Constitution, even when the advocate
is rationally motivated and is not on the soapbox.
This argument stressing the wide scope of the statute could have
been met simply enough by squarely rejecting the defense of overbreadth. Since a majority of the Court thought the act as applied was
constitutional, the case could have been concluded without more, and
consideration of other, invalid applications would have been postponed
until actual cases brought such issues before the Court. However,
perhaps for the reasons suggested elsewhere in this article, the Court
was unwilling to take this stand. Instead, the Chief Justice, in an
opinion subscribed to by three other Justices, announced that he would
construe the statute to proscribe only activities which create a "clear
and present danger." So construed, the statute is of course not overbroad.
By employing the technique of restrictive construction, the Chief
Justice accomplished at least two things: (I) he avoided a definitive
ruling on the delicate question of standing to assert the defense of overbreadth, although his opinion seems implicitly to recognize such standing;125 and (2) he insured that the Smith Act will never be struck
down for unconstitutionality, even if it is applied to the zealot on the
124 United States v. Dennis, (2d Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 201 at 214, affd. Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857 (1951).
125 See p. 283 supra.
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soapbox. The zealot will be acquitted because his conduct falls outside
the bar of tlie act, not because the act is unconstitutional. Thus the Chief
Justice has virtually eliminated the possibility that the top Communist
leaders will some day be regarded as martyrs having suffered conviction
under a statute which was later held unconstitutional.
In these paragraphs, however, this restrictive construction of the
Smith Act in terms of the act's constitutional limits is of interest not
so much for its own sake126 as for the fact that it unnecessarily caused
the second restrictive construction of the Dennis case. Having construed the statute to prohibit only those activities which could be constitutionally proscribed, without having carefully defined those activities, the Chief Justice was faced with the argument that the statute as
construed was unconstitutionally vague. He met this argument by
interpreting sections 2(a)(l) and 2(a)(3) to require, as an element of
guilt, "an intent to overthrow the Government of the United States by
force and violence as speedily as circumstances would permit."127
Partly because the jury had found that the defendants had such an
intent, the Chief Justice rejected the defense of vagueness. The merits
of this ruling, and the precise ground on which it was placed, need
not divert our attention here.128 The point to be noted here is that
this second restrictive construction cannot be rationally reconciled with
the language of the statute. Even section 2(a)(2), which is the only
section dealing with this sort of "intent'' omits any reference to the
speed with which the circumstances might permit overthrow. In the
face of the explicit "intent" clause in section 2(a)(2),1 29 one cannot
fail to notice that all of the sections with which the Court was dealing
[§§2(a)(l) and 2(a)(3) read into §3] omit any comparable reference
to an intent to overthrow the Government, whether speedily or otherwise. In fact, these sections designate other, quite different, mental
conditions as essential elements of the crimes created.
Made in disregard of the plain meaning of the statutory language
as well as the history behind the language, without logical justification,
solely in respect of a policy of self-restraint, the Court's recent narrowing constructions represent judicial conduct which is highly objection126 Legislative history appears to throw no light on the meaning of the Smith Act,
other than to suggest that the legislators meant the normal meaning of the words used. See
76th Cong., H.R. Rep. No. 994, 1st sess. (1939); No. 2683, 3d sess. (1940); S. Rep. No.
1154, 1st sess. (1939); Nos. 1721, 1796, 2683, 3d sess. (1940).
121 341 U.S. 494 at 499.
128 See note 103 supra.
129 Sec. 1 of the Smith Act which makes unlawful attempts to impair the loyalty of
members of the Armed Forces also includes an "intent" clause.
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able. Consider the influence on congressional drafting technique. If
exactness in the use of words is a virtue, and striving for exactness
virtuous, an impetus away from the desired end is engendered by
unreasonable restrictive construction. The result may be that broad
and ill-defined statutes will become the rule and narrowly drawn statutes, covering in as specific a manner as possible the evils to be curbed,
will be the exception.130 This state of affairs could come about easily
as the Congress is encouraged to look to the Court for delimitation of
statutes drawn in an excessively broad manner. Justice Frankfurter
has written:
"In the keeping of the legislatures perhaps more than any
other group is the well being of their fellow men. Their responsibility is discharged ultimately by words....131 But what courts do
with legislation may in turn deeply affect what Congress will do
in the future."132
The prospect of overly broad statutes should give the Court pause
in applying the canon of restrictive construction. Suppose a criminal
statute is so broadly phrased that it purports to impose penalties on
conduct protected by the First Amendment. Is it far-fetched to say that
in the statute itself are embodied elements of coercion (e.g., the apprehension of official displeasure, prosecution, and possibly conviction)
sufficient to deter expression constitutionally protected?133 The argument that the individual should feel unrestrained because of his immunity from official interference with constitutionally protected speech
overlooks the factor that determining what is constitutionally protected
before the Supreme Court has spoken is extremely difficult. One may
not be willing to risk criminal criminal penalties in the event he should
be mistaken. Even if penalties were to be avoided, the stigma, as well
as the expenditure of time, money and effort, which attend criminal
proceedings may serve to suppress legitimate expression until there
would be no likelihood of prosecution. If the effectiveness of the expression deferred depends on timeliness, there is a total loss to society.
While some uncertainty as to the constitutionality of official action
may be inevitable until there is a determination by the Supreme Court,
130 A

recent statute affecting free speech which contains some broadly worded sections

is the Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. L. 987, 50 U.S.C. (Supp IV, 1951) §781.

Further encouragement of broadly drawn laws results when the invalid hypothetical applications of a statute as construed are "separated" from the valid applications. See pp. 271-286
supra.
131 Frankfurter, "Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes,'' 47 CoL. L. Rmr. 527
at 546 (1947).
132 Id. at 545.
183 See Borchard, "Challenging 'Penal' Statutes by Declaratory Action,'' 52 YALE L.J.
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·the Court could encourage carefully and specifically drawn statutes by
limiting the use of the canon of restrictive construction to those cases
in which the statute is genuinely ambiguous, despite the efforts of the
draftsmen. Uncertainty produced by unnecessarily broad enactments
would be circumvented, and Congress, however reluctantly, would be
induced to perform the legislative function which the Constitution allocates to the legislature. Unreasonable restrictive construction is especially difficult to justify when it fails to clarify, prospectively, the uncertainty characteristic of an overbroad or vague statute. For example,
when the Congress unquestionably has passed an excessively broad
statute and the purpose of the restrictive construction is to exclude the
activity of the defendant from the reach of the statute, as in United
States v. CIO, the effect of the restrictive construction is only to assure
liberty for the particular activity practiced by the particular defendant,
for the statute otherwise remains in force as written.134 By invalidating
the statute in its entirety, the Court could at least eliminate for the
future the deterrent effect of the statute on substantially dissimilar
activities protected by the Constitution. On balance, the continued
uncertainty occasioned by the failure of the Court to pass on the validity of an excessively broad statute would seem to outweigh the benefit
derived from this type of narrowing construction, at least when the
statute deters activities protected by the First Amendment. Similarly,
where the purpose of the restrictive construction is to exclude from the
proscriptions of a vague statute activity which is not accompanied by
improper motive, as in Dennis, the uncertainty attendant upon the
vagt•.e statute is in no way abated;135 the zealot on the soapbox, like
the Communist leaders, may intend to march on Washington "as
speedily as circumstances permit." Even more objectionable is the situation where the purpose of the restrictive construction is to exclude
constitutionally protected activity of hypothetical defendants from the
scope of a definite and overbroad statute, and the effect of the restrictive construction is to compound uncertainty. If, as in Dennis, such a
statute is construed to proscribe only those activities which might be
constitutionally punished and they are not carefully defined, not only
445 at 451 et seq. (1943). Cf. ''It would be dangerous if the legislature could set a net
large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and
say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large." United States v.
Reese, 92 U.S. 214 at 221 (1875).
134 See United States v. Painters' Local Union #481, (2d Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d)
854, 49 CoL. L. REv. 1152 (1949).
135 See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 at 138, 65 S.Ct. 1031 (1945) (dissenting
opinion).
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does the doubt remain, unmitigated, as to what activities may be validly
curtailed, but also, the statute having been rendered indefinite, there
is no statutory standard by which individuals may determine what
activities in fact are prohibited, and therefore subject to prosecution.
The altered presumption of constitutionality affecting statutes challenged under the First Amendment may in part be responsible for the
recent performances of the Court. Under the "clear and present danger'' rule, the chances that a statute will be upheld in its application to
instant or to hypothetical defendants if the issue of constitutionality is
met are certainly decreased. The doubt of validity hovering over the
Court is increased and the incentive to avoid the issue is enhanced.
Thus the very preferment which has prompted the Court to formulate
the "clear and present danger" rule may be somewhat frustrated by
improper use of the canon of restrictive construction.
Reappraisal of this canon of avoidance by the Court, at least in its
application to statutes germane to the First Amendment, might well
commence with a consideration of a recent case dealing with the construction of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.136 Justice
Black, writing for the Court, admonished that in construing a statute
the Court should first attempt to ascertain the meaning of the act by
examining its language and legislative history, and, having determined
its meaning, pass on to the questions of constitutionality. He added
that a restrictive interpretation should not be made merely because
giving effect to the intention of Congress might require the Court to
face a question of validity.137 Although Justice Black does not explicitly commit himself as to the appropriate procedure to be followed when
the question of interpretation is found to be reasonably in doubt despite
the efforts of the draftsmen, a fair surmise is that he would then seriously consider a restrictive construction. In paying heed to this Justice's suggestion, the Court would serve notice that the drafting of
statutes carries with it the responsibility of marking their limits so far
as language and policy permit. Society would not be too demanding
if it looked to the Court to encourage the legislative draftsmen to discharge their responsibility with an optimum of care and understanding.
1as United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 68 S.Ct. 331 (1948). Cf. Holmes, "The
Theory of Legal Interpretation," 12 H.mv. L. R:sv. 417 (1899).
137 Nothing was said about a congressional direction that a restrictive construction
shall be made, when necessary to uphold a statute. See p. 296 infra.
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CONCLUSION

Since it is the discretion of the Court and not the command of the
Constitution which is crucial in the judicial attitude toward statutory
overbreadth, congressional efforts to influence that discretion are significant. Illustrative of such efforts is section I (b) of the Internal
Security Act of 1950, which provides:
"Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize, require,
or establish military or civilian censorship or in any way to limit or
infringe upon freedom of the press or of speech as guaranteed by
the Constitution of the United States and no regulation shall be
promulgated hereunder having that effect."188
· It is submitted that this novel "restrictive construction" clause should
be regarded as evidence supporting the presumption underlying the
rule of restrictive construction, i.e., unless otherwise indicated by relevant language and statutory history, the intent of the legislature was
not to enact a law which could be· unconstitutionally applied. This
article's suggestions with regard to the rule of restrictive construction,
and the defense of overbreadth as well, find their strength in the
policy considerations which favor narrowly and definitely drawn statutes affecting First Amendment liberties. If legislative bodies are persuaded by the wisdom of these considerations to the extent that they
enact reasonably narrow and definite legislation, there will be no occasion for the_ Court to adopt any of these suggestions. If the legislators
are not so persuaded, the Court should not deem itself bound by a
legislative direction that these policy considerations should also be disregarded or minimized by the judiciary. Without some judicial assistance in the effort to persuade legislators in this matter incalculable
~ damage to the citizens' freedom to express their ideas may result. If the
Court succumbs to the direction of section I (b) or similar provisions,
and without other justification undertakes to determine by interpretation the boundaries of overbroad enactments, it will be exercising a
judgment which ought to belong to the legislature. One cannot say
that the Court in recent years has acted in a manner which would have
prompted the insertion of se~tion I (b) into the Security Act. Congress
may have precipitated what has been long overdue-a revaluation by
the Court of some of its rules of avoidance.
1ss 64 Stat. L. 987, 50 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1951) §781.

